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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the premier 
center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law Center, in the 
heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative solutions for the leading 
health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic diseases to health care 
financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law Center and School of Nursing 
and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable intellectual resources, including the 
School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has been, and 
will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, national, and 
local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper understanding of the multiple 
ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill Institute hopes to advance scholarship, 
research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-makers in the public, private, and civil society 
sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for enabling more people in the United States and 
throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
• Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon their 
graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, physicians, 
nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many other private, 
public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare graduates to engage 
in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care law and policy and to 
rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, economic, scientific, and 
ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
• Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, using 
a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond a narrow 
vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a scientific endeavor.   
 
• Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between key 
policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent and 
knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order to 
address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President Obama 
and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health reform.  In any 
debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, economic, and legal issues 
is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these issues could lead to a series of high-
stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that advocates of reform strategies anticipate such 
issues in order to decrease the likelihood that legally resolvable questions become barriers to 
substantive health reform.   In an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance 
of the heat of political debate, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown 
University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health 
Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may arise in 
any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research organizations are 
exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health reform, the O’Neill 
Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health reform.  The target audience 
includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key executive and legislative branch 
agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other key players.  This project attempts to 
pave the road towards improved health care for the nation by providing stakeholders a concise analysis 
of the complex legal issues relating to health reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions 
available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are reoccurring questions which are policy-
based and those which are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the distinction 
between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of health 
reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for poverty level 
subsidies and cost-sharing for preventative services.  In contrast, legal issues are those involving 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution allows a certain 
congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as those 
beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning with, “Can 
we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular categories: 1) “Under the 
Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and regulations, can we now…?”; 3)  “ 
Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This final set of questions tends to be mixed 
questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of 
political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems addressed 
are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a constructive 
activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.   Consequently, it 
does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is it an attempt to 
provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  Furthermore, this project 
does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or make recommendations among 
them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide policy makers, attorneys, and other key 
stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health reform and a clear 
articulation of the range of solutions available for resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, and 
current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of over 50 legal 
issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified these ten legal 
issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a bipartisan consultation 
session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and framing of the legal issues.  The 
attendees of the consultation session included congressional staff, executive branch officials, 
advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide range of interests affected by health 
reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal 
issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant reform 
proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are multiple other 
legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is adopted, the system 
changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for an immediate discussion of 
federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
Actuarial underwriting or discrimination based on an individual’s health status is a business feature of 
the voluntary private insurance market. The term “discrimination” in this paper is not intended to 
convey the concept of unfair treatment, but rather how the insurance industry differentiates among 
individuals in designing and administering health insurance and employee health benefit products. 
Discrimination can occur at the point of enrollment, coverage design, or decisions regarding scope of 
coverage.  Several major federal laws aimed at regulating insurance discrimination based on health 
status focus at the point of enrollment.  However, because of multiple exceptions and loopholes, these 
laws offer relatively limited protections.  This paper provides a brief overview of discrimination 
practices, the federal law, and federal reform options to manage discriminatory practices in the 
insurance and employee health benefit markets. 
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
Long-Term Solutions 
• Establish a nationwide group purchasing mechanism in which all residents could automatically be 
enrolled with opt-out provisions for those covered through employer-sponsored plans or with 
coverage through public programs such as Medicaid.  
• Require entities that sell health benefits products to meet minimum coverage standards such as a 
benefit design modeled after the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan. Allow broader coverage 
through an exceptions process similar to that used in Medicare Part D in the case of individuals who 
need benefit different from greater than that specified in the plan design and who can provide 
medical evidence to support the claim.   
• Require payment plans to take into account the higher level of care associated with treating 
individuals with complex underlying medical conditions and thereby avoid the refusal to treat more 
complex patients.  
• Amend Medicaid to create more explicit standards regarding provider payment levels. 
• Revise Medicaid to create coverage for benefits that are necessary to treat and manage serious and 
chronic health conditions whose treatment requires services and benefits not covered through the 
nationwide group purchasing pool. In this way, people who receive standard coverage through the 
pool could still obtain supplemental coverage for serious and chronic conditions through Medicaid.  
 
Interim Solutions 
Amend or Expand Existing Federal Laws 
• Expand HIPAA’s prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions to apply to all persons seeking 
coverage, not just those with requisite “creditable coverage.” 
• Enact legislation to subsidize COBRA benefits and enable people to remain in an employer group. 
• Expand Medicaid to any child or adult unable to obtain coverage through the individual market. 
Expand Protections through Agency Regulations or Interpretation 
• Impose limits on the extent to which insurers and plans can impose treatment limits that 
differentiate between covered physical and mental health conditions.   
• Rigorously oversee state compliance with HIPAA’s non-discrimination and guaranteed issue 
requirements. 
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RELEVANT LAW: 
The following federal laws focus on addressing discrimination based on health status that occurs at the 
point of enrollment, but only tackle risk management techniques linked to coverage to a limited 
degree. 
• Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits intentional and disparate impact discrimination in 
the form of lesser benefits based on race; and prohibits both greater charges and provision of 
lesser-value benefits based on sex.  
• Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) permits employers to offer older workers lesser 
health benefits through the use of an “equal benefit or equal cost” test. 
• Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
prevent any employer-sponsored plan or public insurance program operating in either the group or 
individual market from refusing to enroll a qualified person with a disability. Title II of the ADA 
and Section 504 cover public and federally-assisted programs, but protections are limited to access 
to any coverage, rather than the quality of coverage.  As long as limitations on coverage are applied 
to all recipients, despite the fact that such limitations have a disproportionate impact on people with 
disabilities, they are upheld. ADA contains an “insurance safe harbor” that protects risk 
classification as permissible activity and means that the ADA does not reach the content of 
insurance. 
• Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act (HIPAA) prohibits application of pre-
existing condition exclusions in group health insurance as long as the individual has had at least 18 
months of creditable coverage. But coverage design, as long as applied uniformly, can contain 
specific limitations and exclusions. HIPAA allows employers or insurers to offer premium 
discounts or modified cost sharing in exchange for participation in a bona fide wellness program. 
• Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) prohibits employee health benefit plans 
and insurers in both the group and individual markets from using genetic information to determine 
the level of premiums to be charged. 
• Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act applies to plans and products that cover mental 
health or substance abuse disorder benefits and requires parity in financial requirements 
(deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) and treatment limitations (limits on number of visits 
and days of coverage) for mental and physical illness.   
• Newborns and Mothers Protection Act requires plans that offer hospital stays in connection with 
childbirth to provide a minimum stay following delivery. 
• Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act (WHCRA) applies to group health plans that provide 
mastectomy benefits and requires plans to cover breast reconstruction, prostheses, and other 
treatments addressing complications of a mastectomy. 
• Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) establishes “full and fair hearing” 
provisions and standards for timeliness and conduct of internal appeals of health benefit denials. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Congress has limited the use of actuarial techniques that exclude persons from group insurance 
altogether. However, Congress has only modestly tackled risk management techniques linked to the 
actual content and administration of coverage. The use of discriminatory practices based on health 
status to limit coverage is especially apparent in the individual insurance market. If the federal 
government wishes to move in the direction of sharing health risks more broadly, next steps will 
include creating larger risk-pooling groups and curbing the ability of insurers to limit adequate 
coverage based on health status. 
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: 
An Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law and Federal Reform Options 
 
Sara Rosenbauma 
 
Introduction  
 
This is an important time to focus on the question of insurance discrimination based on health status.  
The nation once again is poised to embark on a major health care reform debate; even as the number of 
uninsured stands at some 45 million persons, millions more may be poised to lose coverage during the 
worst economic downturn in generations.  In addition, a large number of persons may be seriously 
under-insured, with coverage falling significantly below the cost of necessary health care.  In recent 
years, the proportion of insured persons who are underinsured has grown by 60% since 2003, reaching 
an estimated 25 million persons in 2007.1  Health care costs experienced by insured persons now 
account for more than 75% of all personal bankruptcies related to medical care.2  Underlying these 
figures is a national approach to health care financing for the non-elderly that effectively increases the 
odds that those who are in poor health status will be uninsured or underinsured.3  Why this is so, and 
what to do about it, is the subject of this analysis, made timely by recent signals of openness on the 
part of the health insurance industry to address the problem of discrimination based on health status in 
exchange for universal and compulsory enrollment.4 
 
This paper, prepared for Legal Solutions in Health Reform, examines insurance discrimination based 
on health status.  As used in this analysis, the term “discrimination” is not intended to convey the 
concept of unfair treatment5; instead the term is intended to convey how society differentiates among 
the population in exposing individuals to financial risks associated with health care. In the U.S., which 
has built its approach to health care financing largely according to market principles, the challenges to 
managing the system’s potential to discriminate against the sick are especially notable calling for 
incremental reforms that retain markets while introducing innovations into how financial risks are 
managed, not only at the entry point into enrollment, but also in how coverage itself is defined, 
structured and administered. The extent to which this differentiation is permitted – not only at the point 
of enrollment into coverage but also in relation to the design and administration of coverage -- carries 
important implications for the nation’s ability to ensure  health care efficiency and equity.  To the 
extent that the American health care financing system is enabled -- and indeed incentivized -- to 
exclude the sick,6 the consequences extend beyond the ethical or moral.  Indeed, the consequences of 
discrimination in financing implicate the ultimate goal of any nation’s health care system, best 
summed up by the Institute of Medicine: safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and 
equitable.7  All Americans, regardless of health status at any point in time, have a stake in how health 
care financing treats people in poorer health.  
 
This analysis begins with an overview of “actuarial fairness” and “social solidarity,” two concepts that 
represent opposing endpoints along the spectrum of possible approaches to the allocation of financial 
risk for health care across a population. The overview also discusses the tools used by insurers to 
shield themselves against persons with higher health risks.  Depending on where a particular health 
care financing system falls along this broad conceptual spectrum, devising legal solutions to the 
problem of health status discrimination will pose a greater or lesser challenge.   
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Following this overview, the analysis discusses a series of federal laws relevant to the issue of 
insurance discrimination based on health status.  These laws fall along various points of the anti-
discrimination policy spectrum, and offer relatively limited protections against discriminatory 
practices.  For example, group health benefit plans sponsored by state and local governments are 
exempt from laws regulating discrimination in private employer sponsored group health plans.8  In 
addition, separate laws apply to coverage arrangements purchased by government sponsors such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, and a distinct body of law governs state-regulated health insurance sold in the 
individual insurance market.   
 
The paper also considers Medicaid’s continuing role in a reformed health care financing system. 
Medicaid-purchased coverage deserves special consideration because Medicaid’s enrollment and 
coverage features are related to its central purpose of covering individuals whose poor health and 
medical impoverishment virtually exclude them from the private health insurance market.9  In contrast 
to insurance markets, Medicaid coverage is available at the very point that serious health need arises.  
The law contains no eligibility exclusions for pre-existing conditions; 10 many of its numerous 
eligibility categories are expressly designed to deal with coverage during illness;11 and states are 
required to provide for enrollment services in health care settings12 in order to enable enrollment at the 
point of health care need.  Medicaid coverage similarly is governed by principles of reasonableness 
that to a large degree bar the health status-based coverage distinctions that are a hallmark of private 
health insurance, in particular, the complete exclusion of certain health conditions from coverage.13  
How Medicaid might be reconfigured in a health care system in which discrimination based on health 
status is mitigated will be discussed at greater length.  
 
The analysis concludes with a discussion of legal solutions to discrimination that focus on reforms 
aimed at preserving health insurance markets while limiting discrimination, in order to align health 
care financing more closely with the basic goals of a high performing health care system. As described 
more thoroughly below, the individual market presumably would disappear under legal reforms 
proposed here, since the establishment of group purchasing arrangements can be a foundational legal 
step in mitigating discrimination. 
 
I. The Conceptual Starting Point: Defining the Concepts and Describing the Tools of Insurance 
Discrimination Based on Health Status 
 
Understanding insurance discrimination based on health status requires grounding in three sets of 
concepts.  The first is the concept of pooling: the assemblage of members into a group.  
 
The second set of concepts is found along the spectrum of strategic approaches to assigning risk within 
the pool.  At one end lies the concept of actuarial fairness (sometimes known as fair discrimination);14  
and at the other end, the concept of social solidarity. Each concept represents a seminal vantage point 
from which to assess, manage and allocate costs associated with the financial risk of health care 
utilization by members of the pooled group.  
 
The third concept, which will be termed in this analysis as “discrimination tools,” is the mechanisms 
by which discrimination is accomplished by the health benefit services companies that either assume 
risk through the sale of insurance products or manage risk for self insured group sponsors.  
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A. Risk Pooling  
 
Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, two of the nation’s leading experts in insurance law and theory, have 
written that insurance is the “paradigmatic risk spreading institution.”15  This act of risk spreading can 
occur in various ways.  At one end of the spectrum, the risks associated with poor health can be spread 
across an entire society.  For example, enrollment in the risk pool could be automatic for all U.S. 
residents, much in the way that working at a Social Security-insured job automatically leads to 
enrollment in the Social Security system.  Coverage could be financed through broad-based tax 
mechanisms as the financing mechanism.  European nations commonly rely on this social approach to 
achieving and maintaining coverage,16 and the Medicare program also possesses these characteristics.  
 
Alternatively, risks can be spread among small – voluntarily selected and selecting – groups.  This is 
the case with private employer coverage, particularly coverage offered to small groups.  (In truth, of 
course, even a large group employer is a small group when compared to society as a whole).  In this 
voluntary system, employers elect to offer coverage,17 employees elect to buy coverage for themselves 
and their families,18 and insurers elect to either sell insured or administered products in certain 
employer markets.  For example, some health benefit services companies may choose to sell small 
group insurance products in only certain states or may eschew the small group market entirely in favor 
of the non-risk administered products associated with larger employer groups. 
 
B.  Social Solidarity Versus Actuarial Fairness.  
 
How might the risk of loss be spread across a group?  Two concepts that lie at opposite ends of the risk 
spreading spectrum present two distinctly different ways to think about the act of spreading risk.  At 
one end is the “social solidarity”19 approach, which in its purest form spreads the cost of coverage 
equally across the entire group, a practice that is known as “community rating.”20 This practice 
subjects all to the same access to insurance, coverage rules and rates.   Critics argue that under this 
practice, some, such as younger individuals with lower health risks, subsidize older individuals, which 
may keep them from signing up for the coverage itself. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is what Baker and Simon call the “actuarial vision” of risk.21  In this 
model, which goes by the name “actuarial fairness,” actuarial science techniques are used to classify 
individuals by specific characteristics that in turn are associated with the use of care (health care 
experience) and thus, with the risk of financial loss to an insurer (known as medical loss).  Thus, 
underwriting is used to evaluate the risks posed by particular individuals and to adjust enrollment rules 
and premiums accordingly.22  Some individuals may be considered too big a risk to be permitted to 
enroll either at all, or without certain conditions, such as pre-existing condition exclusions designed to 
shield the group from health conditions present at the time of enrollment.  Other individuals may be 
allowed in, but charged disproportionately high premiums.23  
 
Risk shielding continues across the continuum of the insurance enterprise.  Thus, the insurer may 
design the benefit product to avoid certain types of conditions and treatments -- particularly those that 
are costly and chronic -- through the use of coverage limitations and exclusions.  High cost sharing 
may be imposed selectively.  Thus, the shielding process begins at the point of entry and proceeds 
throughout the terms of coverage.  
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The concept of actuarial fairness and its resulting underwriting techniques can produce perverse 
results, particularly when classification of individual risk is based on immutable characteristics such as 
race, national origin, or sex.  For example, African Americans historically have been subjected to 
exclusions and higher premiums because of higher associated health costs,24 therefore the use of tools 
to shield against risks posed by racial and ethnic minority members may be continuing.25  Similarly, 
women traditionally are charged higher health insurance premiums than men, because actuarial data 
tend to show that their health status and health care needs, at least during certain periods of their lives, 
may drive higher utilization rates.26  
 
C.  Specific Risk Shielding Tools 
 
Because Americans tend to pool in small groups (again, even a large employer is a small group when 
compared to society as a whole), there are relatively few persons over whom a health benefit services 
company can spread the financial risks associated with the use of health care.  In this regard, two types 
of health care costs must be considered: macro-level costs and micro-level costs.  Both types of costs 
affect the risk of loss, and for this reason, avoiding the financial losses associated with macro- and 
micro-level costs becomes part of the business of insurance.27  Scores of judicial decisions that 
consider the “business of insurance” in the context of ERISA preemption underscore the broad range 
of design and management tools available to insurers and plan administrators to manage plans from 
financial risk.28 
 
Macro-level costs are associated with coverage design, that is, the benefits, limitations and exclusions, 
coverage definitions, deductible and cost sharing requirements, and the other terms of coverage that are 
embedded in the terms of coverage that apply to the group and  determine the scope of coverage that 
potentially will be made available to any member of the group.  Macro limits come in many shapes and 
forms. And focus on what classes of benefits to cover; whether the terms of coverage apply to 
treatments for certain conditions such as mental illness29 or HIV/AIDS;30 whether the coverage terms 
extend speech therapy only for persons who once spoke and have lost speech as the result of a stroke 
or  extend coverage to children whose inability to speech is connected with conditions present at 
birth;31 or whether certain classes of benefits will be included in a prescription drug formulary, and if 
not, whether to permit participants to seek an exception from the coverage restriction.32  If the terms of 
coverage expressly encompass conditions and treatments or at least do not exclude them, then these 
services become potentially available to members of the group and must be assigned an actuarial value.  
This is because the very presence of covered items and services in the coverage agreement is 
characterized as creating a “moral hazard” (i.e., increasing the likelihood that insured persons will use 
the coverage potentially available to them).33  In this model, the need for health care essentially 
becomes the result of individual choice rather than health status (which by contrast is understood as the 
product of inherent traits, social environment, and behavior, which itself is shaped by the broader 
social environment).34  
 
The second group of financial risks associated with the cost of health care consists of costs at the micro 
level of coverage, that is, at the level at which costs are actually incurred because a member is 
attempting to use benefits.  Thus, if a health insurance contract covers speech therapy, treatments for 
mental illness and treatment for AIDS, the actual cost of care transpires when a particular patient 
makes use of the coverage in the receipt of care.  Thus, how an insurer conducts medical necessity 
reviews and whether an external appeal is allowed becomes a matter of financial risk to the group.35  In 
a similar vein, whether to offer a broad provider network36 and whether and how to pay out-of-network 
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providers in particular cases37 in turn will affect the level of financial risk to which an insurer is 
exposed, as well as the actuarial estimates related to costs and pricing.  
 
In sum, both macro- and micro- level risks are relevant when thinking about risk shielding tools.  
Certain risk shields happen at the preliminary enrollment phase while others occur throughout the 
coverage and management phases of the insurance enterprise. And the tools have an interactive 
relationship with one another.  For example, barring insurers from excluding people in poorer health 
status or putting conditions on their enrollment will in turn affect the level of financial risk to which 
the insurer is exposed. This fact will trigger the need for more back-end risk-shielding tools as part of 
coverage and management, including tools linked to benefit coverage design, cost sharing, and plan 
administration.  Indeed, the more that people in poor health are admitted into a pool without front-end 
restrictions, the greater the need for back-end risk shielding techniques (e.g., limitations on coverage 
and plan administration).   
 
Even before one gets to enrollment and coverage risk shields, a voluntary employment based system 
offers a number of relatively obvious ways to discriminate against poor health risks, such as marketing 
only to large employed groups or healthy smaller groups, a technique that offers companies the 
advantage of larger numbers and/or a relatively healthy self-selected group.  Another obvious strategy 
is to use fixed, open enrollment periods in order to guard against adverse selection by eligible 
individuals who otherwise might seek to enroll only at the point of health care need.  
 
But these two threshold strategies have their limitations.  Even healthy workers can become sick, and 
certain qualifying events, such as divorce may trigger special enrollment periods at firms.  Thus, 
companies must use back-end techniques linked to coverage itself in order to shield against health 
risks.  These risk shielding techniques can be clustered into to two principal domains.  The first domain 
is linked to membership in the group, that is, the ability to enroll and to do so without exclusionary 
terms to screen out pre-existing conditions, and at an affordable cost.  This domain encompasses 
several sub-domains: who is eligible to enroll; the restrictions that might be placed on enrollment; and 
the price that must be paid for membership in the group. 
  
The second domain consists of post-enrollment coverage techniques used to avoid financial risks 
associated with the use of health care services.  This domain likewise encompasses a series of sub-
domains: benefit classes, service and treatment exclusions; contractual definitional terms; cost sharing 
including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and payment maximums; provider network design, 
payment terms, and other structural considerations; and matters of plan administration such as 
utilization review, and a rapid and transparent appeals process.  
 
Again, these enrollment and coverage domains are highly interactive.  That is, they work together in 
various ways and are influenced by one another.  For this reason, regulations aimed at one domain, 
such as barring the use of pre-existing condition exclusions, can be expected to have spillover effects 
in the form of more aggressive coverage design and plan administration techniques.  Indeed, it is worth 
observing that the market interest in high deductible health plans offering limited coverage coincided 
with the enactment of federal and state laws in the latter half of the 1990s prohibiting enrollment 
discrimination,38 along with the provider and consumer backlash against managed care.  
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1. Enrollment-linked Tools  
 
The threshold strategy for health status discrimination is the avoidance of risk altogether by barring, 
preventing, or effectively constraining enrollment. As will be reviewed below, these techniques have 
received a somewhat greater level of attention in insurance reform laws enacted in recent years.  
 
• Barring enrollment by refusing to issue a product. An insurer might bar enrollment outright 
based on health status alone.  This type of absolute enrollment bar is a principal characteristic 
of the individual insurance market.  
 
• Medical underwriting to classify risks and adjust premiums. An insurer might use medical 
underwriting techniques to group risks by personal characteristics that could be expected to 
affect use of care.  Risk classification would permit the adjustment of premiums to reflect the 
level of financial risk perceived to be involved.  Individuals whose characteristics (both health 
status and personal characteristics that predict health status and insurance use) pose higher 
financial risks thus would be expected to pay a higher premium, and in some cases perhaps 
sufficiently high enough to render coverage unaffordable.  
 
• The use of pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods. An insurer might permit 
enrollment while imposing total exclusions for pre-existing conditions or waiting periods of 
modest to moderate length.  This would offer further protection against the assumption of risk 
by placing constraints on enrollment rather than barring enrollment altogether.  
 
• Coverage rescissions and cancellations.  Assuming that an individual is permitted to enroll, an 
insurer might cancel coverage in an ensuing benefit period or revoke coverage during the plan 
year in the event that the individual’s use of resources exceeds anticipated norms, and the 
insurer suspects the existence of fraud at the point of enrollment 
 
2. Post-enrollment Coverage and Plan Administration Risk Shielding Tools  
 
Assuming that enrollment occurs, a second issue arises, namely, how to manage risks associated with 
coverage and utilization of health care.  Several basic strategies exist: limiting the scope of coverage; 
high cost sharing; utilization management techniques and constraining challenges to coverage denials; 
and constraining the size and operation of provider networks and provider payment.  
 
• Limits on the amount, duration, or scope of coverage. Contractual limits on the amount, 
duration and scope of coverage (e.g., the classes of benefits offered, how covered benefit 
classes are defined, and the conditioning of coverage on certain applicable requirements) work 
to minimize the financial risks associated with coverage. For example, coverage of speech 
therapy to “restore speech” automatically excludes coverage for children born with a 
developmental disability who need therapy to attain speech.39  Certain treatments for mental 
disorders or for HIV/AIDS could be radically limited or altogether excluded.40  Similarly, 
embedded and undisclosed practice guidelines that limit available treatments for mental illness 
or addiction41 would shield risk by considerably narrowing the scope of an apparently covered 
benefit class for certain specified conditions. Along the same lines, a medical necessity 
standard that defines treatment as necessary only when restoration of previous functioning is 
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possible automatically eliminates the potential for covering treatments whose medical purpose 
is to help a patient attain, maintain, or avert the loss of functioning.42  
 
• Cost sharing.  Insurers have a range of cost-sharing options, including across-the-board or 
condition- or treatment-specific deductibles, copayments and coinsurance.  Cost-sharing can 
involve both covered services furnished by in- network providers as well as balance billing by 
out-of-network providers in the case of network plans.43  Plans might tier network cost sharing 
in order to use economic incentives (in the form of higher deductibles or copayments) to steer 
patients toward providers that are shown to be more “efficient” in their use of plan resources or 
that have offered a plan additional discounts.44  Similarly, insurers might impose annual or 
lifetime dollar limits on care either generally or by condition.45     
 
• Utilization management and procedures for challenging coverage denials.  Insurers can use the 
case-by-case utilization review process to limit their risk exposure, drafting contracts so that 
they retain broad discretion over whether to approve coverage at all or to impose limitations on 
coverage (e.g., “in our discretion,” or “as determined by us”).46  This discretion can extend to 
the power to determine the evidence that will be considered relevant47 along with the power to 
define an appeals process that favors the insurer.48  Ultimately, because the burden of proof lies 
with the challenger in a coverage denial,49 participants and beneficiaries may face an uphill 
fight.  
 
• Network size, composition and payment.  Network size matters in calculating financial risk.50  
For this reason, limiting primary or specialty network size and composition affects utilization.  
It also potentially deters product selection by individuals with serious and chronic conditions 
who fear limitations on their access to in-network providers.51  Tiering provider networks based 
on performance or price offers an additional technique for shielding a company against risk.52  
Similarly, restricting the scope of payable procedures and items within any covered benefit 
class and paying lower rates for certain covered services, both help shield risk by constraining 
the flow of resources.  This practice may also have the effect to incentivize providers to 
abandon network membership so that they can treat patients on an “out-of-network” basis and 
balance bill for their care.  
 
It is important again to stress the interdependent nature of these techniques.  For example, regulations 
that limit the use of enrollment-related risk management tools can be expected to result in the use of 
higher deductibles and cost sharing, more tightly circumscribed coverage terms, more aggressive use 
of embedded practice guidelines, stricter utilization review in the case of high cost procedures, a more 
tightly controlled appeals system, and more restrictive networks with lower payments.  
 
II.  Federal Efforts to Regulate Insurance Discrimination Based on Health Status 
 
Four major bodies of federal law regulate discrimination by health benefit service companies based on 
health status: civil rights laws; tax law; labor law; and laws that finance state public health activities.  
Although federal laws that protect against insurance discrimination date back to the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, Congress has shown a growing interest in recent years to make additional inroads on the issue of 
insurance discrimination based on health status.  At the same time, the materials that follow underscore 
the limited nature of these more recent laws.   
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A.  Civil Rights Law  
 
Race.  Most states outlaw the use of race-based classifications either directly or as a subset of 
prohibited unfair trade practices acts.53  But such a regulatory approach tends to be confined to laws 
that reach intentional discrimination and exclusion, not the disparate effects that stem from the facially 
neutral use of certain risk classifications.54 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which reaches 
discrimination in both employment and the conditions of employment (including fringe benefits),55 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin and bars both intentional and 
disparate impact discrimination (i.e., unintentional discrimination).56  Thus Title VII would be 
implicated in situations in which protected groups of individuals are exposed to less effective benefits 
as a result of risk classification.57  In addition, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bars 
discrimination in federally assisted activities,58 has been interpreted as prohibiting public insurance 
administration practices that result in racially segregated health care.59  In addition, legislation 
implementing the Civil War Amendments has been interpreted as prohibiting the use of race as a 
classifier in private insurance contracts.60  
 
It may well be that the basis for the prohibition against the use of race as a classifier is not that race is 
not relevant to health risk; indeed, from an actuarial perspective, as in health services research, race 
may be significantly associated with poor health.  Instead, the prohibition appears to arise from the fact 
that a democratic society simply does not allow racial and ethnic minority individuals to be classified 
as poor risks and denied the benefits of insurance based on their immutable characteristics.61  In this 
sense, the rejection of race as a permissible risk classifier for purposes of enrollment or coverage 
represents perhaps the purest example of the trumping of actuarial fairness by social solidarity. 
 
Sex. Less consensus exists where risk classification based on sex is concerned. State laws clearly 
continue to permit risk classification in insurance.62  Thus, prohibitions on the use of gender in risk 
classification vary both by employment and non-employment status and by state versus federal law.63  
Where employment-based coverage is concerned, Title VII appears to produce a more unified 
response, because it has been interpreted to bar both greater charges for one sex, as well as  lesser-
value benefits based on sex.64  As one observer has written, the standard of review is “not confined to 
asking whether male and female employees receive the same policy with identical terms; it instead 
compares how thoroughly that policy actually covers male and female enrollees’ medical expenses.”65  
Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.”66  
 
Age. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) offers only “meager”67 protection against 
discrimination in employee health benefits, since the Act explicitly permits employers to offer older 
workers lesser health benefits through the use of an “equal benefit or equal cost” test.68  Thus, for 
example, EEOC regulations permit the provision of lesser benefits to Medicare-age employees,69 
essentially moving away from a notion of social solidarity and decisively toward actuarial fairness.   
 
Disability. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to employment,70 public programs,71 
and public accommodations,72 while Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits 
discrimination in federally assisted programs.73  At the same time, civil rights laws prohibiting 
discrimination based on disability provide only limited protections.  Both Section 504 and the ADA 
utilize a restrictive test for measuring who is protected, extending their reach only to “qualified persons 
with a disability”74 (a group known as “qualified handicapped persons” under Section 504).75  The 
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concept of “qualified” is a narrow one, requiring the existence of a physical or mental impairment that 
restricts major life activities.76  Poor health status alone is not enough to trigger disability protections.  
Furthermore, even if individuals satisfy the “qualified” test, they lose ADA employment protections 
under ADA Title I once they are no longer considered employed for purposes of ADA protection, even 
if they remain entitled to “COBRA continuation” health benefits under their ERISA health plans.77 
Thus, ERISA itself would have to reclassify individuals as “employees” for purposes of continuation 
coverage for ADA principles to apply.  
 
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 reach public and federally assisted programs, respectively. 
However, these protections, as with the ADA’s public accommodation protections, are limited to 
access to coverage as well as to methods of administration that result in segregated and isolated 
treatment of persons with disabilities.78 (An interesting question is whether insurers in the individual 
market could absolutely bar enrollment based on health status, as many now do;79 presumably the 
insurance “safe harbor” provisions of the ADA would permit such complete exclusionary practices if 
based on actuarially sound principles).80  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court explicitly has 
interpreted Section 504 – the predecessor law to the ADA -- as permitting state Medicaid agencies to 
apply across-the-board coverage limitations on all recipients, regardless of whether the impact of such 
limitations is felt disproportionately by qualified persons with handicaps as a result of their greater 
health needs.81  
 
Similarly, the public accommodations provisions of the ADA have been held not to reach the content 
of insurance.  Thus, private health insurers can single out certain conditions (e.g., HIV/AIDS) for 
complete or near-total coverage exclusion, so long as the exclusion applies to all plan members.  This 
very limited approach to what it means not to discriminate against qualified individuals has been 
upheld in a health insurance context even in cases in which, by its own admission, the insurer can offer 
no actuarial data to justify diagnosis based-discrimination.82  Thus, despite rulings by the federal 
agencies to the contrary, courts have deferred to the concepts of actuarial fairness and risk 
classification, even where actuarial justification is absent, in apparent violation of the ADA’s insurance 
safe harbor, which permits differentiation only when actuarially justified.83  
 
In sum, the ADA (and where applicable, Section 504) may prevent employer-sponsored health plans, 
public insurers, and state regulated private insurers from refusing to sell products to or barring 
enrollment of qualified persons with disabilities.   And both laws would appear to bar administration 
practices that result in isolation and segregation.  But neither law prohibits content design (i.e. what is 
covered) that differentially affects persons with disabilities, nor does either law affect differential 
premiums.   
 
B.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)  
 
HIPAA establishes certain minimum standards for the design and operation of ERISA-governed health 
benefit plans, as well as state-regulated health insurance products in both the group and individual 
markets.  Its provisions establish certain limited protections as well as certain types of bars against 
discrimination based on health status.  Because its provisions focus on health status rather than 
disability, HIPAA has a potentially broader reach than the ADA.  At the same time, HIPAA, like the 
ADA and Section 504, does not reach the content of coverage, nor does it affect the ability of insurers 
selling in the individual market to charge differential premiums based on health status.  Thus, as with 
the ADA and Section 504, HIPAA’s protections apply only at the point of entry into coverage, not to 
the terms of coverage themselves.  HIPAA mandates only that provision be made to allow enrollment 
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by certain people in poorer health status and that ERISA plans and group plans ensure identical 
treatment of persons in poorer health with respect to enrollment, coverage, and premiums.  
 
HIPAA amends ERISA, the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, and the Tax Code to reach ERISA-
governed group health plans, whether self-insured or fully insured, as well as state-regulated insurance 
products in the group market (and with respect to certain provisions, the individual market). 84   In 
effect, HIPAA sets a federal floor on state regulation of the small group market, with very limited 
provisions applicable to the individual market.85  
 
Guaranteed Issue and Renewability in the State-regulated Small Group and Individual Markets.  
HIPAA defines a small group as one that has at least 2 but no more than 50 employees on any business 
day during the preceding calendar year and that employs at least 2 persons on the first day of the plan 
year.86  At the same time, the small group definitions apply only to the extent that a state has not 
enacted an “alternative mechanism,” thereby permitting states to essentially devise their own methods 
for complying with HIPAA’s small group standards.87  The small group standards have as their 
centerpiece guaranteed issue, meaning that insurers operating in the market must accept every group 
that applies for coverage, as well as every individual within each group.88  Even so, insurers may 
impose minimum contribution and participation requirements as long as they do not selectively offer 
their approved products to different employer groups.89  
 
Guaranteed issue requirements also apply in the individual market, but in a particularly limited way; 
the protections apply only to applicants who have not experienced more than a 63-day break in 
coverage, have exhausted COBRA or other continuation coverage, previously had at least 18 months 
of creditable coverage,90 are ineligible for any other coverage, and have not committed fraud or been 
terminated for nonpayment of premiums.91  Thus, only a fraction of all persons who might need 
guaranteed issue in the individual market would qualify for such a protection under the terms of the 
statute.   
 
The guaranteed issue provisions are accompanied by guaranteed renewal requirements, but as with 
guaranteed issue, the guarantees come with constraints, including the right of insurers to terminate 
based on “noncompliance with material plan provisions”92 or movement of employees away from the 
area covered by a plan’s provider network in the case of networked plans.93  In other words, the issuer 
would not have to adjust its network to assure access in the event that group members move.  The 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that administers HIPAA under 
the PHS Act, interprets discontinuances, terminations, and non-renewal to cover rescissions.94  Similar 
renewal rules apply in the individual insurance market.95   
 
HIPAA’s reach is further limited by its terms of enforcement; the law gives states several basic 
compliance options, with limited to no federal oversight of the operation of whether state alternatives 
satisfy HIPAA’s requirements.  Under HIPAA, states can adopt and enforce federal requirements; 
alternatively they can have the federal government enforce HIPAA requirements for them.96  Yet 
another alternative – elected by 48 states as of Fall 2007 – is to establish “alternative mechanisms” for 
achieving compliance.97  There appears to be a vacuum of federal oversight regarding the extent to 
which states’ alternative models satisfy HIPAA,98 despite the fact that the alternative mechanisms must 
be cleared by CMS in order to ensure that all “federally eligible”99 individuals enjoy guaranteed issue 
protections. 
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States that elect to establish an alternative mechanism in the individual market can offer a high risk 
pool (much like a bad driver pool in the case of auto insurance).  News accounts suggest that the cost 
of high risk pools appears to be so prohibitive as to be virtually financially inaccessible.100  
Furthermore, recent litigation involving insurer rescissions in the individual market underscore the 
limited nature of federal oversight of HIPAA’s guaranteed issue requirement.101   
 
Prohibiting Pre-Existing Condition Exclusions.  In order to address issues of portability (that is, 
being able to change jobs without fear of a wholesale or partial exclusion from a subsequent plan), 
HIPAA provides certain prohibitions against pre-existing condition exclusions.  As with guaranteed 
issue, however, the term is defined narrowly under federal law as “a condition, either physical or 
mental, for which medical advice was recommended or received within a six-month period ending on 
the enrollment date.”102  This definition thus can exclude longstanding conditions that were not 
recently treated (e.g., cancer that was successfully treated and that has been in remission for years).  
Furthermore, the prohibition applies only to persons who have “creditable coverage” and who obtain 
new coverage within 63 days of losing “creditable coverage.”103  Rules for calculating when creditable 
coverage exists and its duration are extensive.104  Furthermore, HIPAA offers no protection for newly 
eligible plan members without previous creditable coverage.  Health benefit plans and insurers can 
impose up to a 12-month pre-existing condition exclusion (which may be longer under certain 
circumstances),105 except in the case of pregnancy, the addition of a newborn child, or a newly adopted 
child within 30 days of adoption.106   
 
Access to Coverage: Prohibition against Health Status Discrimination. HIPAA’s central purpose was 
to eliminate health status considerations from eligibility for coverage or from the cost of coverage in 
the group market.  HIPAA thus prohibits certain types of discriminatory actions by ERISA-governed 
plans and state regulated issuers of group health insurance (the non-discrimination provisions do not 
apply to the individual market).107  The range of prohibited conduct spans enrollment, effective date of 
coverage, waiting periods, late and special enrollment rules, eligibility for benefit packages, benefits 
(both cost sharing and benefit restrictions), continued eligibility, and coverage termination.108  Specific 
prohibited bases of discrimination include health status, medical health condition (mental or physical), 
claims experience, the receipt of care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, 
and disability.109  
 
Thus, HIPAA prohibits differential treatment in enrollment or coverage in the case of ERISA health 
benefit plans and products sold in the state regulated group health insurance market.  At the same time, 
HIPAA does not reach content (i.e. what is covered) nor premium cost, so as enrollment barriers are 
removed for members of groups or benefit plans, premiums can rise and coverage can shrink.  Hence 
the paradox of non-discrimination prohibition that are unaccompanied by minimum content and cost-
sharing requirements as well as limits on the amount of financial liability for premiums facing 
individuals and families.  
 
Although HIPAA bars discrimination, the law does not prohibit an employer or insurer from offering 
premium discounts or modified cost sharing in exchange for participation in a bona fide wellness 
program.110  In other words, HIPAA allows rewards for participation in health promotion programs 
that are part of a group health plan as long as the reward is not tied to a particular health factor and is 
available to all similarly situated employees.  Thus, a plan could reward employees who undergo a risk 
assessment upon enrollment (or penalize those who do not), but cannot reward only plan participants 
whose participation results in lowered cholesterol levels. Federal regulations also permit “benign 
discrimination,”111 that is, provision of a reward targeted to individuals with certain conditions, such as 
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rewarding persons with diabetes for participating in a disease management program, as long as the 
reward is not conditioned on the achievement of a certain outcome.112  
 
Whether wellness policies ultimately serve to discriminate against persons in poor health by penalizing 
them for their failure to aggressively take charge of their health remains to be seen.113  Paradoxically of 
course, the widespread use of wellness programs in an era of shrinking coverage ultimately may help 
illustrate the shortcomings of the current approach to non-discrimination.  Suppose that a self treatment 
plan for diabetes recommends frequent and comprehensive podiatric care, an important and effective 
treatment for persons with serious diabetes that can avert the loss of limbs.  Then imagine that the plan 
limits or excludes podiatric care.  Could a plan member be penalized for failing to follow a self-care 
protocol while simultaneously being denied coverage for the evidence-based treatment in question?   
 
C.  The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA)  
 
The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) amplifies HIPAA’s non-discrimination 
rules by prohibiting employee health benefit plans and state regulated insurers from using genetic 
information to determine eligibility for coverage, a prohibition extended to both the group and 
individual markets.114  GINA goes beyond HIPAA, however, in prohibiting the use of such 
information to determine the level of premiums to be charged in the case of both ERISA governed 
health plans and the state regulated group and individual markets.115  Both individual medical 
underwriting of applicants and the purchase of aggregate data are prohibited.116  In this sense, GINA 
can be seen as a further incremental movement toward the concept of social solidarity in its prohibition 
against risk classification based on a dormant, but immutable health status marker.  At the same time, 
GINA does not bar medical underwriting based on current health status, nor does it affect the content 
of coverage.117  
 
D.  Mental Health Parity  
 
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, included in the 
Wall Street rescue plan passed by Congress in 2008,118 addresses the issue of coverage discrimination 
based on health status to a limited degree, even as it preserves the power of health plans and insurers to 
either entirely exclude coverage of mental illness conditions or impose stringent medical management 
limits on coverage in ways far different from techniques used in the design and administration of 
physical health conditions and treatments.  Amending ERISA, the Tax Code, and the PHS Act, mental 
health parity extends the concept of parity (which previously barred only the use of lifetime and annual 
financial caps on mental health benefits) to reach “predominant”119 “financial requirements” and 
“treatment limitations” more generally.  In other words, the Act ensures that financial requirements and 
treatment limitations applicable to mental health/substance use disorder benefits are no more restrictive 
than those requirements and limitations placed on medical/surgical benefits.  The term “financial 
requirement” is expanded to include deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance;120 the term “treatment 
limitation” includes “limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other 
similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”121  In addition, the legislation establishes at least 
some level expectation of parity in access to out-of-network providers, requiring a level of parity “that 
is consistent with the requirements of this section.”122 
 
At the same time, while the legislation requires disclosure of medical necessity criteria,123 it does not 
compel parity in definitions and terms, such as those that define the medical necessity of care, unless 
such terms fall within the revised meaning of parity.124  As a result, the legislation does not appear to 
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prohibit coverage techniques that embed practice guidelines into coverage, such as “acute short term 
hospitalization for addiction,” and that avoid express numerical limits.  Thus, parity does not appear to 
prevent a more granular approach to mental illness and addiction coverage, one that embeds precise, 
permissible treatments into coverage documents, even while using more broad-based coverage terms 
for other conditions.   
 
How the parity amendments are interpreted of course remains to be seen, but the embedding of pre-set 
practice guidelines into the terms of coverage is vastly different in structure and consequence from 
traditional insurance design practices.  In ERISA coverage cases involving physical health care,125 the 
contract specifies broad covered benefit classes, with delegation of decision-making discretion to the 
insurer or plan administrator to decide whether particular treatments are covered (i.e., fall within the 
enumerated classes) and medically necessary for a particular patient.  In these cases, the subject of an 
appeal is the extent to which the insurer may have abused its discretion in applying broad coverage 
terms to a particular case.126  By contrast, coverage documents that employ embedded treatment 
guidelines fix the treatment as a contract term, thereby eliminating the right to appeal, since challenges 
to plan design itself are impermissible under ERISA.127   
 
The implications for mental illness and addiction treatment are revealed in an important case,128 that 
involved a beneficiary challenge to plan coverage limitations that in her view, restricted treatment for 
her addiction to levels too low to achieve results.  She appealed for additional coverage in the form of a 
longer treatment program.  The treatment that had been authorized by the plan was expressed, not as an 
administrator’s discretionary decision applying broad benefit classes, but instead as a specified 
“condition/treatment” pair that was enumerated within the terms of the contract itself. That is, the 
contract specified treatments much in the way that a plan’s prescription drug component specifies 
coverage in the form of a prescribed drug formulary.  As a result, the plan administrator essentially 
was stripped of its discretion to cover more services even if necessary and the claimant had no appeals 
rights because the limitations were fixed by contract rather than discretionary.  In effect, the 
contractual specification of treatment essentially nullified the need for an individualized medical 
necessity determination, since coverage consisted of defined treatments rather than a plan design 
requiring individualized, fact-driven decision-making.  
 
By not incorporating parity in medical necessity into its provisions, the 2008 parity legislation does not 
appear to change plan discretion to use a more granular fixed concept of medical necessity that utilizes 
a fixed approach to identifying and covering medically necessary mental health treatment.  Thus, not 
only does the legislation allow plans and insurers to entirely exclude conditions from coverage, but 
furthermore, the law appears to permit insurers to designate covered medically necessary treatments 
contractually and without according plan administrators the discretion to make individualized coverage 
determinations within broader benefit classes.  The physical health analogy to this approach to 
coverage would be exclusion of certain cancers from coverage entirely and the specification of covered 
cancer treatments without giving the plan administrator the discretion to recognize individual variation 
and tailor coverage accordingly.   
 
It may be that the approach taken to mental health coverage signals the general direction of coverage in 
an evolving health care system in which financing is more closely aligned with evidence-based 
treatments.  For the time being, the parity legislation tolerates differences in approach to coverage 
design (i.e. what is covered) and plan administration in a medical necessity context.   
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E.  Newborns and Mothers Protection Act  
 
As with other acts within this collection of laws, the Newborns and Mothers Protection Act amends the 
Tax Code, ERISA, and the PHS Act, reaching both the state regulated group market and employer 
plans subject to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (15 employees or more).129  Covered plans and 
issuers must provide a minimum of 48 hours stay following a normal delivery, and 96 hours following 
a C-section130 (an earlier discharge may occur if recommended by the health care provider). The Act 
also addresses other dimensions of parity, such as, prohibiting plans from denying enrollment, renewal 
or continued coverage to mothers or newborns covered by the Act or penalize providers that comply 
with the Act or incentivize them to shorten the length of stay.131 
 
F.  Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act (WHCRA) 
 
Amending ERISA, the Tax Code, and the PHS Act, WHCRA applies to group health plans that 
provide mastectomy benefits, requiring plans to cover breast reconstruction, prostheses, and other 
treatments to address the complications of all stages of a mastectomy.132  As with the Newborns and 
Mothers Protection Act, WHCRA prohibits retaliation against providers or the exclusion of persons 
protected by the Act.  
 
G.  ERISA Regulations Governing Full and Fair Review of Claims Denials  
 
As this section describes, ERISA has been revised on several occasions to address certain types of 
health plan conduct in connection with enrollment and coverage. COBRA continuation benefits are 
one example and the amendments noted above offer other examples.  In addition, regulations 
promulgated in 2000 in order to revise the “full and fair hearing”’ provisions of ERISA by establishing 
more speed and transparency to reviews of health coverage denials, may have some effect on improved 
access to benefits by persons in poor health status.  At the same time, the rate at which appeals take 
place appears to be very low, and as a result, the impact of changes in the fair process laws may be 
limited. 133  
 
III.  Proposed Legal Solutions 
 
This analysis reviews the problem of discrimination on the basis of health status, as well as the series 
of laws that have attempted to address the problem.  The focus of this analysis is on federal law; many 
states have enacted similar laws that parallel these federal themes.134 Taken together, the federal legal 
environment indicates a growing interest in mitigating discrimination, particularly at the point of 
enrollment into coverage. But this review also underscores the limited nature of these protections and 
the degree to which federal policy has yet to focus on reforms that affect the design and content of 
coverage itself.  Indeed, by zeroing in on lifting “entry-point” discrimination, the laws may have 
inadvertently triggered efforts by health plans and insurers to move toward the use of greater risk 
shielding techniques in relation to coverage itself, including higher cost sharing, thinner benefits, a 
specified contractual approach to coverage decisions that removes the discretion to allow treatment as 
a matter of individualized medical judgment (especially in the case of certain conditions considered 
risky), and the greater use of “macro-level” treatment exclusions.  Put another way, reducing 
discrimination against the sick at the front end may have resulted in greater discrimination against 
those who do manage to enroll, thereby triggering a rapid escalation in the proportion of under-insured 
persons.  
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Federal laws outlining minimum coverage requirements, such as those aimed at improving coverage 
for certain conditions (pregnancy, newborn inpatient stays, breast cancer), nibble around the edges of 
coverage design.  Furthermore, laws aimed at ensuring guaranteed entry into coverage arrangements 
contain numerous limitations and loopholes, such as non-discrimination on the basis of pre-existing 
conditions that restricts its reach to persons who have not recently been in treatment (within 6 months), 
or who have continuous and unbroken coverage (an impossible bar for persons who have lost 
employment because of illness, given the attendant effects of job loss on income).  Indeed, COBRA, 
which ostensibly permits former employees who are sick to remain members of their plans, carries an 
unsubsidized premium that makes it all but unattainable to the very people in need of continuation 
coverage.  Disability law is of limited utility, because the definition of who is a qualified person with a 
disability is narrow.  Furthermore, the ADA and Section 504 have been interpreted as not reaching the 
content of coverage; even if this limiting interpretation were to be reversed, the ADA’s “insurance safe 
harbor provision” (as well as courts’ willingness to waive the need for even a remotely colorable 
actuarial justification of a claim of elevated financial risk)135 means that even qualified persons with 
disabilities gain no protection from the law.  
  
Devising a solution to this problem in a health care system that largely rests on market principles of 
actuarial fairness is not simple, since the heart of actuarial fairness is distinction based on health status.  
However, certain reforms, outlined below, could be expected to have important mitigating effects.  
 
A.  The Legal Establishment of a Nationwide Group Purchasing Mechanism  
 
Currently few legal mechanisms exist for creating groups in the market place outside of employment; 
furthermore, most employee groups are too small to be sufficiently robust in relation to the financial 
risk of illness. As a result, the illness of a few typically leads to escalating premiums unless the sick are 
pushed out (a seemingly endless process until no one is left in the group).  Small and mid-sized 
employers, like individuals, are essentially micro-groups.  Even large and jumbo employers are, in the 
vast scheme of things, limited pooling arrangements where health risks are concerned, given an aging 
population and the relatively poor health profile of far too many Americans.   
 
Thus, the most basic step in crafting a legal solution to discrimination is enactment of new federal 
legislation to establish a nationwide purchasing group, much in the way Massachusetts’ health reform 
plan establishes a state-level group.  The argument for a national group -- like that which undergirds 
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan or the Medicare Part D prescription drug program -- is its 
sheer size and ability to sustain financial risk.  State pools, such as the one in Massachusetts, might be 
feasible for large states with relatively healthy populations, but less so for smaller states with older 
populations or populations in relatively poor health.  Legislation to establish a nationwide purchasing 
group (which of course could be subdivided into state or regional purchasing markets) resolves this 
distributional issue while also preventing insurers from selecting state-based markets with healthier 
populations and thus, lower risk. 
 
As the insurance industry already points out in its own health reform recommendations,136 compulsory 
enrollment is a crucial precondition to the ability to eliminate barriers to enrollment tied to health 
status in order to prevent adverse selection.   Presumably therefore, legislation to establish the pool 
would also provide for guaranteed issue and renewal, a total bar against pre-existing condition 
exclusions, and bars against discrimination in access to coverage based on health status.  Unlike 
existing HIPAA standards as noted above, the legislative standards established for a nationwide group 
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could be defined to eliminate the restrictions and limitations that dilute HIPAA’s current effectiveness 
(e.g., the ability to exclude certain pre-existing conditions from coverage).   
 
In a fully realized version of this legislative approach, all Americans could be automatically enrolled in 
a national purchasing pool, with opt-out provisions for those covered through employer-sponsored 
plans or other remaining forms of “creditable coverage.”137 Enrollment into the pool could be 
supported through income-related subsidies (a combination of taxes and direct payments) that would 
cover the cost of enrollment, with collection of premiums a function of the federal tax system coupled 
with alternative payment mechanisms for individuals who do not pay taxes.   
 
In the case of employers who desire to retain their own coverage arrangements, the national purchasing 
pool could serve as a reinsurance mechanism in order to protect employer groups against high losses 
for covered benefits. This use of the federal pooling mechanism would permit employers (whether 
ERISA governed or exempt as in the case of public employers) to utilize the pool as a reinsurance 
mechanism, with a legislatively established “attachment point” (i.e., the point at which reinsurance 
coverage begins).138 
 
In the case of individuals whose coverage is derived directly from the pool, the legislation also could 
provide for payment of risk-adjusted premiums to participating plans, thereby utilizing actuarial 
experience not as a means of excluding or limiting coverage, but as a mechanism for recognizing the 
realities of different health status at the point of distribution among participating plans.  
 
A further consequence of a national pool would be eliminating of the need for an individual market.  If 
a nationwide purchasing pool is made available to all persons as a matter of law, then there is no need 
for an individual market, which by definition exists to discriminate, since all persons seeking coverage 
through the individual market are effectively a high risk. 
 
B. Minimum Participation Standards for Sellers of Health Benefit Services Products; Non-
Discrimination Against the Sick in Coverage Design and Coverage Determinations; Non-
Discrimination in Provider Payment and Network Formation 
 
Whether selling to individuals insured through the pool or through an employer reinsured through the 
pool, entities that seek to sell health benefit products could be required to meet coverage standards.  
Those standards presumably would include a benefit design pegged to the Federal Employee Health 
Benefit Plan or another widely purchased “benchmark” plan, an approach similar to that used in the 
case of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.139  At the same time, the current minimum 
coverage standards applicable to ERISA plans (e.g., pregnancy non-discrimination, coverage of 
mothers and newborns, coverage of women with breast cancer, and mental health parity) could be 
applied to all products sold through the pool, whether directly or to employers reinsured through the 
pool, with cost sharing similarly regulated.  
 
A far more complex question relates to how to address the phenomenon discussed previously: 
coverage design approaches that discriminate through exclusion of recognized medical conditions and 
the use of contractual treatment strategies for other conditions in order to avoid insurer discretion to 
authorize more expansive or alternative coverage. This bifurcated approach to coverage design – broad 
classes and medical discretion for some conditions, total exclusion of other conditions, and non-
discretionary contractual treatments for still others – is inherently discriminatory based on health 
status.  
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One plausible answer is that, in fact, coverage generally is moving toward the designation of 
conditions and treatments and the elimination of medical discretion, particularly as evidence builds 
regarding the effectiveness of treatment.  If this is the case – that is, if coverage design for both 
physical and mental conditions increasingly resembles a specified formulary – then the most logical 
response would be the enactment of standards that permit this evolution to occur while simultaneously 
enacting laws barring the exclusion of any recognized medical condition and creating an exceptions 
process for recognized conditions for which the recognized treatment is inappropriate.  While 
contractual condition/treatment pairings may ultimately serve population-wide interests, a small but 
significant proportion of the population have complex conditions that simply do not fit neatly into 
recognized condition/treatment pairs.  Without a legal remedy, these individuals and their treating 
professionals face the difficult choice of either accepting coverage for inappropriate treatment or 
alternatively, going without coverage at all.   
 
In order to guard against such an outcome, one legal option is to include in the legislated coverage 
standards an “exception” system similar to the exceptions process that is an element of the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit program.140  This process allows coverage exceptions to gain access to 
medically necessary prescription drugs not covered under Part D plans’ formulary for individuals 
whose need for appropriate treatment is not satisfied through the standard formulary design.  A 
national coverage arrangement could provide a similar exceptions process, permitting coverage for  
“extra contractual” treatments based on specified evidence such as the clinical judgment of treating 
professionals, evidence gleaned from the health services research literature and studies, and expert 
opinion.  In reviewing a request for an exception, presumably a discretionary review standard 
paralleling the current ERISA fiduciary standard would apply;141 to further militate against arbitrary 
denials, the internal review process could be coupled with an independent external appeals system 
permitting an impartial de novo external review, followed by limited judicial review based on the 
record.  This approach has been utilized by Congress previously in so called “patients’ bill of rights” 
legislation,142 which has not been considered since 2001, but whose provisions are highly relevant to 
any effort to develop procedural mechanisms governing claims determinations.  
 
A further measure of reform would be to require the development of risk-adjusted payment 
methodologies, not just to plans selected by enrollees, but also with respect to provider payments, in 
order to incentivize higher or more intensive levels of care for patients whose underlying conditions 
require a more complex level of care.  For example, filling a cavity for a healthy 10-year-old with no 
other health conditions other than cavities may bear little or no practical relationship to filling a cavity 
for a 10-year-old who also has serious autism.  Dental treatment is necessary for both children, but the 
resemblance in terms of time and resources may end there.   In addition, legal safeguards would be 
required to ensure that providers with experience in the treatment of patients with complex conditions 
are not arbitrarily excluded from coverage networks as an indirect means of shielding plans against 
higher risk patients.  
 
D.  Medicaid Reforms  
 
As noted, Medicaid plays a vital role in a market based system that differentiates among individuals 
based on health status with respect to both coverage and care.  The question is whether Medicaid 
remains equally essential in a world in which all persons are enrolled in a common purchasing 
arrangement.  One approach would be to retain Medicaid for those individuals who meet its conditions, 
that is, to segregate these individuals from the broader pool. The benefit of this approach is protection 
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of the larger pool from higher health risks.  The downside is, of course, the impact of such segregation 
on Medicaid beneficiaries.  While coverage is broad and cost-sharing is highly controlled, Medicaid 
provider participation levels are extremely low, chiefly because of very low payment rates.143  Whether 
to continue to segregate low income persons in a separate risk pool thus becomes a pressing matter in a 
health care quality context.  
 
Certainly Congress could amend the Medicaid statute to create far more explicit standards than those 
that currently apply in order to ensure that payment levels are sufficient to ensure equality of health 
care access.144 Another legal option however, would be to retain Medicaid as a source of coverage for 
what commonly is termed “long-term care,” that is, community and institutional services and supplies 
that are essential to maintaining health and averting deterioration among children and adults with 
highly advanced health care needs.  Even in a broad pooling arrangement such as the one proposed 
here, with uniform and regulated coverage standards and safeguards against discrimination, it is likely 
that the coverage design will not encompass those classes of services that extend beyond services 
connected with comprehensive primary care, such as treatment for acute physical and mental 
conditions, and the routine management of certain types of chronic health conditions such as diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, asthma, mild to moderate depression, and other conditions amenable to modern 
“disease management” techniques. 145 
 
However, a small portion of the population experiences conditions of sufficient duration and severity 
to require more intensive types of health care and supportive services on an ongoing basis, examples of 
which include nursing facility services, personal care services, specialized forms of durable medical 
equipment, private duty nursing care, habilitation services, long term rehabilitation, specialized case 
management, and other forms of care that extend beyond the furthest reaches of even a generous 
insurance policy.  Medicaid’s strength is its coverage of service classes that have no counterpart in 
traditional health insurance,146 and over four decades, the program has become the nation’s 
predominant source of health care financing for these services.  Even if Congress were to enact a 
national purchasing pool with strong non-discrimination standards with respect to both enrollment and 
coverage of the type visualized here, it is likely that the pool would exclude items and services at the 
long-term care end of the health care spectrum, much as Medicare does not cover long-term care.   
 
In order to ensure that persons with advanced health care needs are covered for long-term care, 
Medicaid could be amended to provide long-term care coverage for persons who receive standard 
coverage through the pool (either directly or as a function of participation in a reinsured employer-
sponsored plan).  Eligibility could be conditioned on a need for long-term care services as a result of a 
specified level of functional limitation, a model that has been used previously by Congress to establish 
Medicaid coverage for persons in need of long-term care.147   This tiered approach to coverage could 
finance items and services  needed by children and adults with special health care needs, such as 
school-based intensive health care services for children receiving early intervention or special 
education, specialized care for children receiving services through the child welfare system, children 
and adults with severe mental and emotional disorders, and persons who experience significant 
limitations of daily activities and who require specialized care in community or institutional settings.   
 
As with previous Medicaid initiatives targeted at assisting persons with significant disabilities, 
enrollment could be income-related. 148  As with the current Medicaid program, the model of 
administration could remain one of state administration subject to federal requirements regarding 
eligibility, enrollment, coverage, quality oversight, and plan administration.  In essence, under this 
proposal, Medicaid would evolve into a funder of long-term care services for the population, with a 
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nationwide purchasing pool for the non-elderly population employed to furnish a more standard range 
of health care needs.  
 
Concluding Thoughts: Short Term Reforms  
 
The solutions laid out here take a long term view of the problem of discrimination, with an eye toward 
the system evolution envisioned in President Obama’s campaign health reform proposals.  That system 
depends on the establishment of a national health insurance exchange for purposes of guaranteeing 
accessible and affordable coverage.  This analysis lends additional justification for such an approach, 
since moving in the direction of a nationwide coverage arrangement also mitigates discriminatory 
enrollment and coverage practices.  In such a reformed system, Medicaid also could be reconfigured to 
focus on the population’s long-term health care needs.  
 
Of course, achieving this type of evolution is viewed as a lengthy process. What interim steps might be 
taken to provide more immediate legal relief?   
 
• Congress might amend HIPAA to strengthen its protections against exclusion based on pre-
existing condition, by repealing the current treatment exception.   
• Congress also could strengthen its guaranteed issue provisions to eliminate the continuous 
coverage requirement.   
• Congress also might incentivize states to establish Massachusetts-like group markets by 
enacting stop-loss protections in states that elect to establish state-based risk pools, which in 
turn would also obviate the need for the individual insurance market. Federal stop loss could 
contain protections against discrimination and exclusion in enrollment, with states given more 
latitude to design coverage.  
• Congress might also enact legislation to finance COBRA, thereby enabling more individuals 
with serious health conditions to retain their attachment to an employer group, not only as a 
means of deriving coverage but in order to protect guaranteed issue rights. 
• In addition to extending coverage to low income adults, Congress might create a new state 
Medicaid eligibility option to extend Medicaid coverage to any child or adult who has been 
rejected from the individual insurance market or whose premiums exceed 5% of gross family 
income on an annualized basis.  This option might be in addition to or in lieu of state risk pool 
legislation, and would use Medicaid to achieve coverage of individuals with pre-existing 
conditions who are not connected to a group, and thus who require entry into the individual 
market. The benefit of this approach is readily available federal financial participation (which 
could be enhanced), strong coverage, and controlled cost-sharing.  The shortcoming, as noted 
previously, is the health care access barriers faced by recipients.  Nonetheless, Medicaid has 
been demonstrated to have a powerful impact on access to health care, and as an interim step 
holds much promise as an alternative to the current individual market.  
 
Finally, there are steps that could be taken administratively to reduce insurance discrimination based 
on health status.  In implementing mental health parity, the United States Departments of Health and 
Human Services, Treasury, and Labor could impose limits on the extent to which insurers and plans 
can utilize treatment limits that differentiate between covered physical and mental health conditions in 
terms of the extent to which additional coverage can be authorized when medically necessary.  While 
the 2008 amendments do in fact permit discrimination in the form of condition exclusions, the question 
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of whether plans and insurers can use fixed treatments for mental conditions while more flexible 
approaches for physical conditions remains an open one.   
 
Furthermore, the federal government could be far more robust in overseeing state compliance with 
HIPAA’s non-discrimination and guaranteed issue requirements in the state regulated health insurance 
markets.  The evidence suggests that state high-risk pools are inaccessible, thereby calling into 
question states’ reliance on such pools in lieu of implementation of HIPAA’s protective standards.  
This suggests the need for conditions for high risk pools, in order to guarantee that such pools do not 
become a subterfuge for HIPAA non-compliance.  
 
What appears a far less viable remedy -- either in the short term or long term – is a solution that relies 
on the use of high risk pools.  In concept, such pools have some attraction, because they arguably offer 
a means of achieving coverage for persons unable to secure insurance through “mainstream” plans.  
Risk pools, however, have the potential to isolate the sick into costly and separate coverage 
arrangements; furthermore, they can incentivize markets to be more discriminatory in both access and 
coverage, on the theory that a high risk pool will be there to catch those who are excluded.  In the end, 
high risk pooling appears to be an approach whose effect is to exclude the sick and those who fall 
outside an artificially defined health norm.  With the potential for an ever-shifting concept of what a 
healthy norm is, a high risk pool cannot address the reality of how people’s health can change.  An 
individual in good health today can become the person with cancer tomorrow.  In order to provide an 
effective means of financing appropriate health care, which is the whole point of the enterprise after 
all, health insurance must recognize the oftentimes fleeting nature of good health, and must provide for 
stable coverage arrangements that can assure access to appropriate care both in good health and bad. 
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